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STATEMENT OF CASE
I. INTRODUCTION

This matter involves a dispute between the Plaintiff/Respondent, Idaho Property
Management Services, Inc. d/b/a The Rental Connection (hereinafter referred to as
"I.P .Mgt.") and Defendant/Appellant, Don Macdonald (hereinafter referred to as
"Macdonald") relating to a mobile home owned by Christopher J. Pattison and Rebekah A.
Pattison, hereinafter referred to as "Pattison".

Simply put, this is a case of Macdonald representing himself, pro se, requesting his
day in court.

This matter evolves in its entirety from Macdonald's attempt to defend himself
from being harassed by counsel for I.P.Mgt. and classified as the mobile home owner and
consequently subject to the terms and conditions of the property rental agreement, dated
August 18,2010, between I.P.Mgt. and Pattison.

Macdonald has asserted multiple times in this case that he simply had a lien interest
in the Pattison mobile home. In its June 13, 2014, Respondents Reply Brief, I.P.Mgt. has
finally acknowledged and confirmed that fact but now calls it "Immaterial". Hardly.
I.P.Mgt. wishes it were so.

Macdonald contends that as the lienholder, rather than the owner, it was neither his
duty nor responsibility to remove Pattison's mobile home. Rather it was I.P.Mgt.'s
obligation to pursue Pattison to remove their mobile home and if they refused to do so then
follow the proper legal process. I.P.Mgt. did neither.

Although I.P.Mgt. does not directly state that they are substituting Macdonald, the
lienholder, for Pattison the owner, it appears that I.P.Mgt. feels content to imply, that
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"lienholder" and "owner" are synonymous based on Macdonald's Lien Sale Declaration of
Opposition (Opposition) dated April 4, 2012.

But even so, Opposition, dated April4, 2012, was filed 12-days past the March 23,
2012, dead line and in direct contradiction to the express wording ofboth Opposition and
the March 13, 2012, Notice of Application for Lien Sale Authorization (Notice) in further
contradiction to Idaho Code § 55-2009B(4). Moreover I.P.Mgt. was well aware of this fact.

Macdonald's Opposition, tardy as it was, was simply a belated attempt by
Macdonald to preserve his lien hold interest.

Because I.P.Mgt. refused any kind of settlement offer while continuing to harass
Macdonald, it claims to have incurred thousands of dollars in lost rent, and to have
ultimately bore the cost of removing the mobile home, ("which had become a health hazard
and lost all value"), and incurred thousands of dollars in attorney's fees and costs as well- all of which I.P .Mgt. now expects Macdonald to reimburse - - improperly I might add.

Citation to the record - Idaho Transportation Department Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale,
March27,2012-R Vol1 p.23
Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition, April 4, 2012 - R Vol 1 p. 24
Mobile Space Rental Agreement, August 18, 2010- R Vol1 p. 21, 22
Letter from Lempesis to Macdonald, July 18, 2012- R Vol 1 p 2
I.P.Mgt.'s June 13,2014, Reply Brief, I. Introduction.

Charles Lempesis Esq., without evidence, but in continuing his sarcasm that runs
throughout his Reply Brief, contends that Macdonald was attempting to "extort" $10,000.
As noted in his letter from Lempesis to Macdonald (July 18, 2012), his Complaint
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(October 11, 2012) and, court hearing (November 26, 2013), Lempesis continually
peppers his brief with provocative words like "extort" and "scheme" and attributes other
"threatening" quotes to Macdonald without any substantiation.

This is a blatant distortion of the truth. In fact Macdonald was attempting in
conversations in June and July of 2012 to resolve the Pattison mobile home problem and
to convince I. P. Mgt. to purchase the mobile home from owners Christopher J. Pattison
and Rebekah A. Pattison for $10,000.

Mr. Lempesis's July 1, 2013, affidavit contains inadmissible hearsay throughout.
Lempesis refers to "multiple" conversations with Macdonald (of which there was only
one) and numerous contacts with "my office" of a threating nature. This is all whimsical
nonsense on counsel's part.

Citation to the record-Affidavit of Charles B. Lempesis, July 1, 2013 -R Vol 1 p. 54 to 56
Letter from Lempesis to Macdonald July 18, 2012- R Vol 1 p 26
Hearing Transcript, November 26,2013 -Tr., p. 40 L. 22
Complaint For Monies Due and Removal or in the Alternative For Order for
Foreclosure of Statutory Lien, dated October 11, 2012. - R Vol 1 p. 2 Par. 2
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STATEMENT OF CASE
II. RELEVANT FACTS

In I.P.Mgt. 's Reply Brief of June 13th, 2014, attorney, Charles B. Lempesis, has
composed a well written work of fiction-- but that's what it is: fiction.

Mr. Lempesis, using the District Court as a stumbling block rather than as a guiding
light to the truth, has used Macdonald's prose inexperience against him and has succeeded
in obtaining a motion for Summary Judgment so that Macdonald does not get the
opportunity to expose the fiction.

The District Court rejected Macdonald's original July 9, 2013, affidavit titled
Defendant's Opposition tor Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, because of two
certain and specific technical deficiencies: (1) it did not have the word "Affidavit" in the
heading and (2) the notary public, Bonnie Mori, had inadvertently neglected to sign her
name next to her notary stamp. Macdonald attempted to correct both deficiencies at the
hearing on September 10,2013, but inexplicably the District Court maintained the
Summary Judgment decision.

Citation to the record - Defendant's Opposition for Plaintiff's Motion ior Summary Judgment,
dated July 9, 2013- R. Vol. 1, p. 172 to 215.
Hearing on September 10, 2013- Tr., p. 17 to 22
Macdonald is requesting that: (1) this court reverse the Summary Judgment and
remand the case back to the District Court for trial so that Macdonald has the opportunity
to present his case in Kootenai County District Court or (2) in the alternative, that the
monetary damage award be significantly reduced.
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Citation to the record- Affidavit titled Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration- R. Vol. 2, p.278 to 282
A bit of background. On August 18, 2010, Pattison entered into a property rental
agreement (Mobile Space Rental Agreement) with I.P.Mgt. that permitted the Pattisons to
keep the mobile home on lot #2 within Dorchester Park located at 1753 Lunceford Ave. in
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. Without cause, without reason and with little notice, on September 6,
2011, the Pattisons were told that they had to remove the mobile home from Dorchester
Park. Rather than remove it, the Pattison's abandoned the mobile home and fled. I.P.Mgt.
made no attempt to locate or pursue the Pattisons.

Citation to the record-Mobile Space Rental Agreement, August 18,2010- R Voll p. 21,22
I.P.Mgt.'s June 13, 2014lower page 2 and top page 3

I.P.Mgt. terminated the Mobile Space Rental Agreement on November 9, 2011.
Thereafter, in an effort to preserve his lien interest, Macdonald attempted to intercede on
behalf of Pattison with I.P.Mgt. to reach an accommodation. But I.P.Mgt. insisted that the
mobile home be removed and further implied that Macdonald should foreclose on the
property and step in as the new owner. This Macdonald refused to do.

Citation to the record - Mobile Space Rental Agreement, August 18, 2010- R Vol 1 p. 21, 22
Complaint For Monies Due and Removal or in the Alternative For Order for
Foreclosure of Statutory Lien, dated October 11,2012- R Vol 1 p. 16 to 27
On March 6, 2012, I.P.Mgt. applied to the Idaho Transportation Department (lTD)
for an Application For Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale (Application). On March 13,
2012, lTD issued a Notice of Application for Lien Sale (Notice) and on the day thereafter
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(March 14th) sent the Notice to Macdonald along with a Lien Sale Declaration of
Opposition form (Opposition.)

Both documents: The Notice and the Opposition, expressly stated that in order to
stop the lien sale, the Opposition form had to be returned to the lTD within ten (1 0) days
from the Notice date- that deadline date being March 23, 2012.

When the Declaration of Opposition was not returned by the target date of March
23rct, on March 27, 2012, the lTD, in accordance with its standard operating procedures,

issued its Authorization To Conduct A Lien Sale (Authorization). Twelve days after the
March 23rd target date deadline, and 8-days after the Authorization was issued, on
April 4, 2012, Macdonald returned the Opposition.

Citation to the record - Idaho Transportation Department Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale,
March 27, 2012- R Vol 1 p. 2323
Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition, April 4, 2012

R Vol 1 p. 24

The factual dispute rests on this twelve-day discrepancy. I.P.Mgt., despite what it
refers to and acknowledges as an "untimely objections," nevertheless apparently claims
that by returning the Opposition at all (no matter how late after the deadline) that
Macdonald was responsible for stopping the lien sale and therefore should be held liable
for any resulting damages.

Macdonald rejects that claim and contends that I.P.Mgt. had already received their
notice to proceed to sale (the Authorization) on March 27th-- that I.P.Mgt. should have
proceed to sale

particularly since I.P.Mgt. never received notice from lTD that the

Authorization had been rescinded. Macdonald's tardy Declaration of Opposition, though
not valid, was seized upon by I.P .Mgt. as a pretext to pursue the perceived deep pocketed
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Macdonald rather than proceed to sale and/or pursue the rightful owners, Pattisons.
Moreover, I.P.Mgt. never throughout this entire matter has ever protested that I.P.Mgt.
acted improperly by permitting an invalid Opposition to rule the day. Rather this entire
action against Macdonald was simply a vindictive act on the part ofl.P.Mgt's counsel.

Citation to the record - Idaho Transportation Department Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale ,
March 27, 2012- R Vol 1 p. 2323
Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition, April4, 2012- R Vol1 p.
24I.P.Mgt.'s June 13, 2014, Reply Brief, I. Introduction. Page 1, I.P.Mgt. continues
to contend that Macdonald is the mobile home owner and has the duty and
responsibility to remove the Pattison mobile home and, if not removed, pay rent as
defined in Idaho Code §55-2003(14) as if Macdonald were the owner.

The issue of ownership, while raised early and often by I.P .Mgt.' s counsel, has long
been contested by Macdonald. The July 18, 20 12, Lempesis letter to Macdonald states
throughout "As I have orally informed you, the manufactured home owned by you ... "
and repeating "You are hereby notified that the manufactured home owned by you ... " and
later again "remove from my client's property the manufactured home owned by you."
Counsel needs to be reminded that "lienholder "and "owner" are not synonymous.

Citation to the record - Lempesis to Macdonald letter, July 18, 2012
- R Vol. 1 p. 26. item #1
Apparently I.P.Mgt. fails to comprehend that as a lienholder Macdonald has no
right to remove the mobile home that Macdonald does not own and on which Macdonald
never foreclosed. Christopher J. Pattison and Rebekah A. Pattison are the owners and
residents as defined in Idaho Code. §55-2003(16). The Pattison's ownership is evidenced
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by the Mobile Space Rental Agreement between I.P.Mgt. and the Pattisons, and which is
defined in Idaho Code. § 55-2003 (15).

In I.P.Mgt. 's Reply Brief, I.P.Mgt., at last finally and unequivocally
acknowledges that Macdonald is the lienholder and not the owner but then goes on to
state several times it is "immaterial in this matter". Really?

As noted in the original October 11, 2012, Complaint, after the Pattison rental
agreement was terminated on November 9, 2011, Macdonald somehow miraculously and
unilaterally was designated by I.P .Mgt. as being the mobile home owner for purposes of
claim damages and, moreover, that Macdonald, was now bound and required in
accordance with the Pattison terminated rental agreement ( an agreement to which he was
neither a signatory nor, in fact, had ever seen prior to these proceedings) to pay rent and
costs as if Macdonald was the mobile home owner rather than the lienholder.

On what basis did Macdonald turn from lienholder to owner? And why is it
"immaterial?"

Apparently, according to I.P. Mgt., it was because on April4, 2012, Macdonald
returned the Opposition, and I remind the court, 12-days after the deadline. If only I.P.
Mgt's wishing could make it so.
Citation to the record - Mobile Space Rental Agreement, August 18,2010
-RVol1 p.21,22
I.P.Mgt.'s June 13,2014, Reply Brief, II Relevant Facts, page 2,
Complaint For Monies Due and Removal or in the Alternative For
Order for Foreclosure of Statutory Lien, dated October 11, 2012 - R
Vol1 p. 2 item IV
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ARGUMENT
I, STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary
judgment is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the
motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ld.; I.R.C.P.
56( c). The facts will be liberally construed and all inferences will be drawn in favor
of the non-moving.
Sorensen v. Sating Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. Inc. 141 Idaho 754,
758 (2005).
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ARGUMENT
II. IS APPELLANT'S VERIFIED STATEMENT IS AN AFFIDAVIT.

Two issues are raised here: was the affidavit an "affidavit" given it's (1) lack oftitle
and (2) lack of notary signature next to the notary's seal.

In regards to the lack of notary signature on Macdonald's Defendant's Opposition
For Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment, dated July 9, 2013:
Respondent's June 13, 2014, Reply Brief on page 11 notes thatAppellant's pleading submitted in opposition to the Summary
Judgment motion is not an Affidavit nor anything close to an
Affidavit. Even Shakespeare would have to admit that the
document submitted by Appellant by any other name is not an
Affidavit.
A.
Appellant's Opposition for Plaintiffs Motion
for summary Judgment does not contain the signature of a
Notary Public (See Tr p179), and therefore does not meet the
requirements of an affidavit.
Idaho Code§ 51-1 02(5) states: "'Affidavit' means a
declaration in writing, under oath, and sworn to or affirmed by
the declarant before a person authorized to administer oaths."
"The seal shall be impressed below or near the notary
public's official signature on each notary certificate which he
administers." (Emphasis added) Idaho Code § 51-1 02(3)
Shakespeare would disagree with counsel in regard to the naming of the Affidavit.
The document submitted by Macdonald was, and is, an Affidavit. All it lacked was a title.
It's much more likely that Shakespeare would implore counsel "not to make a scarecrow of
the law."

In fact, nothing in Idaho Code § 51-1 02(3) states "The seal shall be impressed
below or near the notary public's official signature on each notary certificate which he
administers."
In its entirety the section 3 code § 51-1 02(3) states:
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TITLE 51
NOTARIES PUBLIC AND COMMISSIONERS OF DEEDS
CHAPTER 1
IDAHO NOTARY PUBLIC ACT
51-102. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter:
Idaho Code § 51-1 02(3) "Resident" means a natural person who has
fixed his habitation in the state of Idaho and who, whenever absent,
intends to return to that place of habitation in Idaho.

Citation to the record - Defendant's Opposition For Plaintiff's Motion For Summary
Judgment dated July 201
R. Vol. L p. 172 to 215.
I.P.Mgt.'s June 13,2014, Reply Brief, II Is Appellant's Pleading an
Affidavit. Page 11
Even were it to be so, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in their wisdom allow
for a "harmless error".
Idaho Rules
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
As amended through April 2, 2014,
Rule 61. Harmless error
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is grounds for granting a
new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding, which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties. (bold emphasis added)
And a 1983 State ofNew York case hits the nail squarely on the head:

In this action to recover damages on a fire insurance policy,
judgment was entered on the basis of a grant of summary judgment to
plaintiffs on the issue of liability under the first cause of action and a
subsequent stipulation as to damages
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In granting summary judgment Special Term rejected an affidavit
submitted by defendant from one of its investigators because it was
undated and lacked the signature of the notary public whose notary
stamp was affixed to the affidavit. (bold emphasis added)
The affidavit, if accepted, would have, for purposes of summary
judgment, connected plaintiffs with the origin of the fire which, according
to the fire marshals, was incendiary in nature.
Defendant, submitting a properly executed affidavit by the same
investigator, moved to reargue. In reality, the motion was one for renewal.
In any event, Special Term, holding that a party may not use reargument to furnish deficiencies in proof in its original submission, denied
the motion.
This was in error. Defendant was not offering new or different
facts to support its original opposition to the motion. It was submitting the
same affidavit properly executed.
The notary's failure to sign the investigator's affidavit is the
type of defect which a court may permit to be corrected upon such
terms as are just or, if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced,
disregard. (bold emphasis added)
Supreme Automotive Mfg. Com. V. Continental Casualty Company, 97 A.D.2d
page 700 New York, November 3, 1983.

And in a 91-year old Idaho Case the court ruled - "It has been held in some cases that affiants in judicial proceedings - - -

may, be amended, and where the jurant is lacking it may be shown that parties
were sworn."
Grandview State Bank V. Torrance, 38 Idaho, page 388, 393- (Idaho 1923)
In the I. P. Mgt. vs. Macdonald case, Macdonald's notary, Bonnie Mori, failed to
sign her name to defendant's Opposition For Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment,
dated July 9, 2013 . Notary Bonnie Mori did affix her seal and noted that she was a Notary
Public for Idaho and residing in Coeur d'Alene with her commission expiring 12/8115.

Further, in preparation for rehearing at the District Court on September 10, 2014,
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Ms. Mori submitted a letter of apology and explained her inadvertent failure to sign her
name next to her seal. The court chose to ignore it.
Citation to the record - Opposition For Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment,
dated July 9, 2013- R. Vol2, p. 179
September 10,2013 hearing
p. 171ines 1 to 13

Tr., p. 16, line 24 & 25 &

As to the second point, the lack of appropriate title, a recent 2009 Idaho Supreme
Court ruling makes short work of the District Court's over sight. The Court ruled--

Defendant moved to strike Shame's (an employee of the
Plaintiff Houston) declaration because it did not constitute an affidavit.
The declaration lacked a jurat, which is necessary in order for it
to constitute an affidavit. Grandview State Bank v. Torrance, 38 Idaho
388, 393, 221 P. 145, 146 (1923).
"Plaintiff responded by filing an affidavit of Shames that was
identical to his declaration, except that it included the required jurat and
notary seal. .. The districe court refused to strike the Sames affidavit"
Houston V. Whittier, 147 Idaho 900, 902 (2009)
In the I. P. Mgt. vs. Macdonald reconsideration rehearing, Macdonald filed an
July 11, 2013 affidavit of Macdonald that was identical to his original July 9, 2013,
declaration, only this time it also included the required Bonnie Mori signature.
Citation to the record - Defendant's Opposition for Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
dated July 9, 2013-R. Vol. 1, p. 172 to 215.
Defendant's Opposition for Plaintiffs Motion for Removal ofNuisance
dated July 11,2013- R. Vol. 2, p. 216 to 229.
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When issuing the Summary Judgment District Court failed to consider the Caddie
Bates V. Capital State Bank & M.P. Meholin, 18 Idaho Pg. 429. 434 (Idaho 1910) case.
Whatever name or designation might be given to
this specific action, it still remains a fact that the action
was instituted primarily for the recovery of the specific
personal property described in the complaint, or its value,
and the sufficiency of the pleading must be determined
upon the facts pleaded rather than upon any name given
to the plea~fing or the cause of actiQ11-'
(underlined for emphasis)
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ARGUMENT
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED
As argued in the preceding section, the trial court improperly put form over
function in refusing to treat the verified and sworn Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment as an affidavit. The trial court should have looked behind the cover to
consider the material factual and legal disputes raised in the verified and sworn statement.

The first is that Macdonald raised the fact that he was not the owner of the mobile
home. R. Vol. 1, p. 173. The second is that I. P. Mgt. had wrongfully proceeded with the
filing of the lawsuit against Macdonald in contravention of the clear instructions of the
"authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale. R. Vol. 1, p. 173-174. And the third is that I. P. Mgt.
was overreaching on its claims for monetary damages against Macdonald. R. Vol. 1, p.
175- 1784. All of these material issues of fact and law are further argued in other sections·
of this brief.

The trial court erred in putting form over function and failed to consider the verified
material issues of fact and law that were raised in the verified and sworn statement.
Moreover, the very same the material factual and legal disputes raised in the verified and
sworn statement were also raised in the second affidavit of Macdonald that was filed on
July 11,2013. R. Vol. 1 p. 218-229.
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ARGUMENT
IV. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED
"This Court reviews a trial court's decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for
reconsideration under an abuse of discretion standard.' A trial court does not abuse its
discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds
of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an
exercise of reason.' Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B) states '[a] motion for
reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time
before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen ( 14) days after the entry of
the final judgment.' The court considered Dr. Gallegos-Main's argument that the Patient's
motion should have been brought under Rule 59( e), but recognized that a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) was proper, even if filed after final judgment
had been entered, because the Patient sought reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
When considering a motion for reconsideration under Rule 1 l(a)(2), the district court
should take into account any new facts, law, or information presented by the moving party
that bear on the correctness of the district court's interlocutory order. However, new
evidence is not required and the moving party can re-argue the same issues in addition to
new arguments. Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801; 291P.3d1000, 1007 (2012).

In this matter, the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring the liberal
interpretation of the rules of civil procedure mandated by I.R.C.P. 1 (a) and failing to
disregard insubstantial and minor defects as required by l.R.C.P. 61. Both of the verified
sworn statements that had been previously submitted to the trial court by Macdonald raised
admissible material

issue~

oflaw and fact that precluded the entry of the earlier summary

judgment.
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ARGUMENT
V. THE COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF
$10,349.26 FOR RENT AND OTHER COSTS INCURRED FROM NOVEMBER 25,
2011, THROUGH JULY 31, 2013
A.

The Respondent, I.P.Mgt., wrongfully imitated the civil action against the

Appellant, Macdonald.

Contrary to Idaho Code.§ 55-2009-A Notice of Lienholder-- which provides for
only 60-days of back rent- -Ellen Booker, an I.P.Mgt. employee, submitted an affidavit
dated October 11, 2013, in which Ms. Booker claimed I.P.Mgt.'s damages, pursuant to the
terms of the Pattison Mobile Space Rental Agreement (dated August 18, 201 ), as if it had
not been terminated on or about November 9, 2011.
The following table encapsulates the calculations of Ms. Booker. The bold are time
periods in question
Rental Amount
"Rents due and owing from November 25,
2011 through July 25, 2013"

Term

Daily rental rate July 25, 2013 to
July 31, 2013

Amount

20/months

$295.00

$5,900.00

5/days

$9.833

$49.17
$5,949.17
Total

Rental Total
Late Fee
Monthly Rental late fee "Rental Agreement
provides for a late fee of Forty Dollars ($40)
per month"
"Five Dollars ($5) per day for every day after
the fifth (5th) day ofthe month."
Daily Rental late fee
11/25/2011 to 7/23/2013
Daily Rental late fee
7/24/2013 to 7/31/2013
Late Fee total
Taxes "2011 and 2012 prepay"

Term

Amount

20/months

$40.00

$800.00

603/days

$5.00

$3,015.00

11/days

$0.00

$0.00
$3,815.00

Total
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Total

$585.09
$10,349.26

Ms. Booker claims the loss sustained by I.P.Mgt. was $9,764.17 [comprised of
$5,949.17 in lost rent (that's for 20-months, not the 60-day maximum as called for by
statute) plus $3,815.00 in late fees] and $585.09 in taxes for a total amount of$10,349.26.
Citation to the record - Affidavit of Ellen Booker, October 15, 2013- R. Vol. 3, p. 341 thru 345
Mobile Space Rental Agreement dated August 18, 2010
- R., Vol. 1, p. 21,22
Mobile Home termination, November 9, 2011- R Vol. 1 p. 17 item IV
I. P. Mgt. claims that they could not move forward with a Lien Sale of the

Pattison's abandon mobile home because Macdonald, the lienholder, had submitted a Lien
Sale Declaration of Opposition. (Opposition)

This is a self-serving lack of action on I. P. Mgt.' s part and a convenient excuse not
to proceed with the mobile home sale as previously authorized by lTD. The Opposition
dated April4, 2012, was submitted 12-days after the March 13, 2012, deadline (3113/2012

+ 10-days = 3/23112 to 4/4/2012 = 12 days) as required and boldly stated in the Opposition
form itself. Therefore it was invalid.

I. P. Mgt.'s accusation was simply a sham way for I. P. Mgt. to substitute and

pursue a perceived deep pocket lienholder rather than the pursue the mobile home owners,
the Pattisons, who both abandon the mobile home and defaulted on the Mobile Space
Rental Agreement.

Citation to the record - Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition, April4, 2012- R Vol 1 p. 24
Mobile Space Rental Agreement, August 18, 2010 - R Vol 1 p. 21, 22
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The Respondent's June 13,2014, Reply Brief states on page 6 thatRespondent IDAHO PROPERTY was informed that until the lien
was released or the objection was withdrawn, the Department of
Transportation would not approve an Application for Lien Sale and
the only recourse was to file an action with the Court.
The only support for this claim is Ginger Thomsen's Affidavit of July 18,
2013, in which she alleges verbal conversations sometime in January of2013 with two
different Idaho State employees: Barbara in the Department of Motor Vehicles and Nancy
with Idaho Department of Transportation. There was no of mention the previously issued
and as yet rescinded, Authorization to Conduct Lien Sale (Authorization) from March 27,
2012.

Evidence shows that the claim on the Reply Briefis incorrect. On March 27, 2012,
the Idaho Transportation Department did issue an Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale,
which I.P.Mgt conveniently chose to ignore for 7-months (April to September) after which
they initiated their lawsuit on October 11, 2012.
Citation to the record - Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale- R Vol 1 p. 23
Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition- R Vol1 p. 24 on April4, 2012.
Mobile Space Rental Agreement, August 18,2010- R Vol1 p. 21,22
Complaint For Monies Due and Removal or in the Alternative For Order for
Foreclosure of Statutory Lien, dated October 11,2012- R Vol1 p. 16 to 27
Affidavit of Ginger Thomsen, July 18, 2013 - R Vol 2 p. 230 & 23
Respondent's June 13, 2014, Reply Brief on page 6
Idaho Transportation Department Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale,
March 27,2012- R Vol1 p. 23
In the Respondent's June 13, 2014, Reply Brief on page 8Due to Appellant's acts and omissions, Respondent IDAHO
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PROPERTY incurred damages in the form of lost rents, taxes,
attorneys' fees and costs. The Court properly awarded Respondent
reimbursement for the same.
How can this be true? Again evidence shows that on March 27, 2012, Idaho
Transportation Department did issue the Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale.

In the Respondent's June 13, 2014, Reply Brief on page 3Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-2001, et seq, Respondent obtained an
Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale from the Idaho Transportation
Department and gave Appellant MACDONALD, the lienholder, notice of
the same. (See Tr p23, Exhibit "8" to Respondent's Complaint)
Appellant MACDONALD filed a Lien Sale Declaration of
Opposition on or about April4, 2012. (See Tr p24, Exhibit "C" to
Respondent's Complaint Respondent IDAHO PROPERTY was thereafter
disallowed from selling or removing the 1969 Pathfinder HS TL until the
Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition was rescinded or the Lien was
satisfied. (See Tr p231-232 Affidavit of Ginger Thomsen
Citation to the record - Idaho Transportation Department Authorization to Conduct a
Lien Sale, March 27,2012- R Vol1 p. 23
I. P. Mgt. has put fourth no evidence that the March 27, 2012, Idaho Transportation

Department Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale, was "thereafter disallowed from selling."
In the January 28, 2013, unidentified communication between Ms. Thomsen and a Nancy
at Idaho Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and Barbara at lTD. It would seem that the
ladies have take it upon themselves to violate Idaho Code§ 55-2009B(4) "A timely mailed
declaration," by permitting Macdonald's 12-days late (3!13/2012 +10/days = 3/23112 to
4/4/2012 = 12 days) filing of the Opposition to improperly and illegally supersede the
stated terms of the Opposition form:
"Important Notice! For this sale to be stopped, this form must be completed
and return within (1 0) days of the date on the notice of application for
authorization to conduct a lien sale".
The Opposition form should have been filed by Macdonald by the dead line date of
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March 23, 2012. It was not. It was submitted by Macdonald on April4, 2012, well after the
stated deadline.
Citation to the record Idaho Transportation Department Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale ,
March 27, 2012- R Vol 1 p. 23
Lien Sale Declaration of Opposition, April4, 2012- R Vol 1 p. 24

The following is a time line of the above-described events.
1)

Millfll~1QlLApplication

for Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale submitted to

Idaho Transportation Department by The Rental Connection I Luann Warren.
""<·;

. . . Ill

2)

March 13, 2012, Idaho Transportation Department issued their Notice of
Application for Lien Sale Authorization.

3)

March 14, 2012, Idaho Transportation Department mailed their Notice of
Application for Lien Sale Authorization to Macdonald.

4)

Mar~l}

27, 2012, Idaho Transportation Department approved I. P. Mgt's Application

for Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale and provides the applicant with their
Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale
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Citation to the record Idaho Transportation Department Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale ,
March 27, 2012- R Voll p. 23
5)

April 4, 2012, Appellant Macdonald filed a Lien Sale Declaration of
Opposition - R Vol l p. 24. which was 12-days late.
(3113/2012 + 10-days = 3/23112 to 4/4/2012 = 12 days)

Citation to the record Sale Declaration of Opposition, Dated April4, 2012 - R Vol1 p. 24
6)

October 11, 20 12, Idaho Property Management Services, Inc. D/B/A The
Rental Connection filed their complaint with the District Court.

Citation to the record Complaint For Monies Due and Removal or in the Alternative For Order for
Foreclosure of Statutory Lien, dated October 11,2012- R Vol1 p. 16 to 27
7)

January 28, 2013, Ginger Thomsen allegedly "spoke" with both a Nancy
at the IDT and a Barbara of the DMV concerning "a new application for
Lien sale would not be approved and our only recourse would be file an
action with the Court "
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Ms. Thomsen never appears to have mentioned that she (I.P .Mgt.)
already had an Authorization to proceed to a lien sale (from March 27,
2012) that I.P.Mgt. never acted upon
Citation to the record - Affidavit of Ginger Thomsen, dated July 18, 2013,
-R Vol2 p. 230 & 231.
Idaho Transportation Department Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale ,
March 27, 2012,- R Vol 1 p. 23
In concluding the above, baring any evidence to the contrary, I. P. Mgt. was
authorized on March 27,2012, to conduct the lien sale, therefore I. P. Mgt.'s claim that
Macdonald caused I. P. Mgt.'s damages after March 27, 2012, is simply and plainly
incorrect.

No evidence has been presented of any written notification from lTD rescinding the
March 27, 2012, the lTD Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale. All that has been offered
by I. P. Mgt. is that their employee, Ginger Thomsen, had some sort of informal
conversation (presumably or by phone) with two presumed employees Nancy, and Barbara
at the ITD and DMV respectively, and at some point in the prior 10-months someone must
have rescinded the sale authorization. Again, n evidence has been presented of the
recessiOn.
Citation to the record - Idaho Transportation Department Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale ,
March 27, 2012,- R Vol 1 p. 23
Affidavit of Ginger Thomsen, dated July 18,2013,
- R Vol 2 p. 230 to 232
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B.

The trial court erred in awarding excessive damages.

"Defendants shall pay to Plaintiff the monthly rent and other costs incurred
from November 25, 2011 to July31, 2013 in the amount of $1 0,349.26"

Based upon the affidavit of Ellen Booker, this total claimed amount represents:
(1) $5,949.17 in rent, at the monthly amount of $295.00;
(2) $3,815.00 in late fees, at the monthly amount of $40.00 - it is notable
that pursuant to the Rental Agreement (Exhibit A of the Verified
Complaint) that late fees/charges are "synonymous with 'additional
rent"'; and,
(3) $585.09 in taxes.
The Defendant is not the owner of the mobile home. The Defendant's sole
interest in the mobile home was as lien holder, as admitted to by the Plaintiff in
Paragraph V of the Verified Complaint. There was no admissible evidence
proving that the Defendant was the titled owner of the mobile home.

As a lien holder, and in accordance with Idaho Code Section § 55-2009A(2),
the Defendant is only liable for:

1) Utilities, which is defined as a "charge" under Idaho Code Section 552003(12). And the plaintiff is not seeking any utility costs against the
defendant.
2) Rent- which is specifically defined by Idaho Code Section 55- 2003(14)
as "periodic payments to be made in consideration for occupying a lot"
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Under Idaho Code Section § 55-2009A(2), the defendant's rental liability
is specifically limited to a maximum of 60 days of rent, or in this case, a
total of 2 months of rent in the total amount of $590.00.
3) Any and all costs" Unlike the terms "fees" "rent" "services charges" and
"other charges" which are all specifically defined by the state legislature
in Idaho Code Section§ 55-2003, the term "costs" is not defined by the
legislature ..
The Plaintiffs are arguing that the terms costs should include rent, late
fees and taxes.
However, as the legislature took the effort to specifically define the term
rent and specially used the term rent immediately following the clause
relating to costs, and based upon the legal doctrine of expressio unis est
exclusio alterius, to toss the very specific and defined term of "rent" into

the generic pot labeled "costs" goes against the express and carefully
defined intent of the legislature relating to rental liability.

The reference to the term "costs" in Title 20 Chapter 55 of the Idaho Code
first starts with Idaho Code Section §55- 2009A(2). Thereafter it is referenced in:
1)

Idaho Code§ 55-20098(1) relating to the costs of sale;

2)

Idaho Code§ 55-20098(2)(f) relating to the costs of a civil action.

3)

Idaho Code§ 55-20098(5) specifically stating that an application fee is
recoverable as cost

4)

Idaho Code § 55-2009F(I)(a), again relating to the costs of sale and
specifically limiting the amount of the cost; and

5) Idaho Code § 55-2014 (4) again relating to the costs of a civil action.
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The use of the term "costs" in Title 20 Chapter 55 is specifically related to
the out of pocket expenses incurred in selling the mobile home and in litigation.
The term costs is not related to the specifically defined term of "rent", that is, the
"periodic payments to be made in consideration for occupying a lot."
Nor does the term cost include late fees, as late fees are specifically
defined by the legislature as a "fee."
Nor does the term cost include the Plaintiffs claim for taxes.
In Idaho Code § 55-2009A(2), the state legislature specifically stated that
the lien holder would be liable for all utilities from the date of the notice, up to the
maximum of 60 days rent prior to the notice and "all other costs." By specifically
identifying the respective categories of the lienholder's obligations - utilities, rent
and costs - to now accept Plaintiffs' argument that the specifically defined term of
rent should be included in the phrase "any and all costs" goes against the specific
definitions and specific listings of the lienholder' s statutory liability.
The Plaintiffs may argue that the final sentence of Idaho Code § 552009A(2) that states "The home may not be removed from the lot without a signed
written agreement from the landlord or manager showing clearance for removal,
showing all moneys due and owing paid in full, or an agreement reached with the
legal owner and the landlord." is an indication that all of the rents must be paid by
the lienholder to remove the mobile home.
That is correct, but only if the lienholder wants to take possession of the
mobile to foreclose its security interest. However, if the lienholder does not want to
take possession of the mobile home, then in that event, the lienholder's interest is
subject to the sale of the mobile home by the landlord and the distribution of the
proceeds in conformity with Idaho Code § 55-2009F.
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Based upon the admissible evidence that is presently before the Court, the
extent of the Defendant's interest in the mobile home was strictly limited to that of
a secured party and not a legal owner.
1)

Any monetary judgment that may be entered for the Plaintiffs claimed
monetary relief is limited to foreclosing out the Defendant's security
interest in the subject mobile home and does not attach to any other
asset owned by the Defendant.

2)

Any monetary judgment that may be entered on behalf of the Plaintiff is
limited to the proceeds of the judicial lien sale of the subject mobile
home. Idaho Code § 55-2009F.

3)

Any monetary judgment that may be entered against the Defendant is
limited to foreclosing the Defendant's security interest in the subject
mobile home and, subject to any liability being limited to the
Defendant's security interest, any claimed damages for rents are
limited to rents accruing for a maximum of sixty ( 60) days. Idaho Code

§ 55-2009A.

4)

Because the Plaintiff did not provide any additional evidence as to
other "costs" that the Plaintiff is claiming, the Plaintiff's judgment is
limited to the maximum of sixty (60) days rent which, based upon
Exhibit A of the Verified Complaint is a total of $590.00.

Because the Defendant is not the legal owner of the subject mobile home
and merely has, or had, a security interest in the same, the Defendant is not liable
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for any rents, other that the maximum of $590.00 and then only to the extent of
the Defendant's security interest in the subject mobile home.
The Defendant is not liable for any trespass damages, removal damages,
storage cost damages or other similar claimed damages of the Plaintiff.

The Defendant's liability is strictly limited to 60 days of rent, utility charges
(which are not claimed by the Plaintiff) and the costs of foreclosing out the
Defendant's security interest.

The Defendant is not liable for anything else and the Defendant is certainly
not subject to treble damages.

In addition, any judgment that may be entered against the Defendant may
only be executed upon the foreclosure Defendant's secured interest in the mobile
home. No personal liability attaches to the Defendant.

To attach personal liability to a lender on a mobile home would create a
chilling effect to any transaction involving a loan secured by a mobile home.
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ARGUMENT
VI. THE COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED REIMBURSEMENT OF
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $11,657.95

With the granting of the appellant's request that this matter be either remanded or
bared upon the vacation of the order of summary judgment or for a vacation of the award of
damages, the trial court award of attorney fees and costs should also be vacated pending
further proceeding before the trial court.

Bedke v Picket Ranch and Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 41 (2006)
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ARGUMENT
VII. THE APPELLANT IS NOT THE OWNER OF THE MOBILE HOME
Macdonald's objection to I.P.Mgt., March 27, 2012, Authorization to Conduct a
Lien Sale, which is not provided for in accordance with Title 49 of Motor Vehicles Idaho
Code § 49-1705, because in this matter we are not dealing with a motor vehicle, but rather
a mobile home and should be governed under the Manufactured Home Residency Act.
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ARGUMENT
VIII. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAl,
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
THE RESPONDENT, I. P. MGT., IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF A
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
In its Reply Brief, Respondent states that "Respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of its attorneys fees incurred in the response to this appeal pursuant to
IAR 41 and the applicable provisions ofldaho Code§§ 12-120, 12-120(1) and§ 12-121."
However, even though the Respondent, I. P. Mgt., thereafter submitted argument about
the trial court's award of fees and costs, at the trial level, (see, generally, Respondent's
June 13, 2014, Reply Brief, p. 17- p. 20 underline emphasis added) the Respondent, I. P.
Mgt., failed to make any argument as to why it would be entitled to an award of
attorney's fees on appeal.
The Respondent's one and only reference to its claim of attorney's fees on appeal is
markedly similar to that of the appellant in

Weaver v.~arle ~ros., 129 Idaho 497, 503

(1996).
As noted by the Supreme Court in Weaver v. Searle Bros.
In the statement of issues in its initial brief on appeal, Rosalia
requests attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code. §§ 12-120(3) and
12-121, I.R.C.P. 54 and I.A.R. 41. Rosalia did not address this issue
in the argument section of either of its briefs on appeal. Therefore, we
do not address the issue because Rosalia has not complied with I.A.R.
35(a)(6)."
In the Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497, 503 (1996).
There are a multitude of similar holdings in the Idaho Reports:
"In their brief, the Benscoters request attorney fees on appeal as follows:
'Benscoter seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 41 '.
We have repeatedly held that we will not consider a request for
attorney fees on appeal that is not supported by legal authority or
argument.
"Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is not the authority for the awarding of
attorney fees on appeal. It simply provides, any party seeking attorney
fees on appeal must assert a claim as an issue presented on appeal in
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the first appellate brief filed by such party as provided in Rules
35(a)(5) and 35(b )(5). Those rules both provide that the party
claiming attorney fees on appeal must include that claim as an issue
or additional issue on appeal, and the party must 'state the basis for
the claim. Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(6) and 35(b)(6) provide that
the argument portion of the brief must contain the contentions of the
party with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons
therefore, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the
transcript and record relied upon.'
"Attorney fees are awardable only where they are authorized by statute or
contract. If the party is claiming that a statute provides authority for an award
of attorney fees, the party must cite to the statute and, if applicable, the specific
subsection of the statute upon which the party relies. If the party bases its claim
for attorney fees upon a contract, then the party must likewise identify that
portion of the contract upon which the party relies as authority for the awarding
of attorney fees. The party must then provide a reasoned argument, supported
by case law as necessary, explaining why that statutory or contractual
provision entitles the party to an award of attorney fees in this instance. For
example, if the party seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12
120(3) on the ground that the case is an action to recover in a commercial
transaction, the party should, to the extent necessary, provide facts, authority,
and argument supporting the claim that the case involves a commercial
transaction' and that such transaction is the gravamen ofthe lawsuit. Because
the Benscoters have not supported their request for attorney fees on appeal
with any authority or argument, we will not consider that issue."
"In Weaver v. Searle Brothers, 129 Idaho 497, 503, 927 P.2d 887, 893 (1996)
appellant simply requested attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code.§§ 12-120(3)
and 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54 and I.A.R. 41. We held: [Appellant] did not address
this issue in the argument section of either of its briefs on appeal. Therefore,
we do not address the issue because [appellant] has not complied with I.A.R.
35(a)(6). The mere citation ofldaho Code§ 12-121, even by a respondent,
without providing any argument, is insufficient for an award of attorney fees
on appeal."
Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369-370 (2003) (internal citations removed)
"When the prevailing party in the action cannot yet be
determined and there is a statute or contract providing that the
prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees, we would
normally permit the trial court to award the prevailing party attorney
fees for the appeal. We will not do so in this case, however, because
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Bagleys have not properly requested an award of attorney fees for the
appeal.
"As an additional issue on appeal, they stated:
The Bagley's are entitled to attorney fees on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section § 12-120(3)
and as the prevailing party under Rule 54 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tyler v. Keeney,
128 Idaho 524,915 P.2d 1382 (Ct.App.1996); see
also Idaho Code ANN.§ 12-120(3) (2009). The
Thomasons' appeal is also frivolous and attorney fees
are awardable pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and
12-123. See Idaho Code ANN. §§ 12-121 & 123.
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 justifies the Bagleys'
request for attorney fees on appeal and the Court
may determine the amount awarded pursuant to this
Rule.
"In the argument portion of their brief, Bagley's did not address their
request for an award of attorney fees. For example, they did not explain what
provision in Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees in
this case. They did not elucidate how Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, which is
applicable in the district courts and the magistrate's division of the district courts
(Idaho R. Civ. P. 1(a)), grants the right to attorney fees on appeal. They did not
explicate how Idaho Code§ 12-123, which does not apply on appeal, applies to
this particular appeal. They did not enlighten this Court as to how Idaho
Appellate Rule 41, which does not provide authority to award attorney fees,
authorizes such an award here. Finally, they did not expound upon how this
appeal meets the standard for awarding attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121,
nor did they even state what that standard is

Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805 (2010).

The Respondent I.P. Mgt. has failed to comply with I.A. A. 35(a)(6) in raising
its claim to an award of attorney's fees on appeal and the Respondent is not
entitled to any award of its attorneys fees on appeal regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
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CONCLUSION

Simply put:
1)

I.P.Mgt. received an Authorization from the lTD to sell the Pattison's
mobile home.

2)

I.P .Mgt. did not act on the Authorization in instead preferring to act on
Macdonald's tardy and there after invalid Opposition to the lien sale and
in an attempt to obfuscate and confuse the court, substitute Macdonald
the lienholder for Pattison the owner.

3)

I.P.Mgt. never objected to or pursued with lTD the fact that they had an
already valid Authorization already in hand.

4)

Out of malice I.P .Mgt. counsel's singular focus was on Macdonald.
Counsel then used the summary judgment provided by the district court
to obscure I.P .Mgt.' s lack of diligence and it did not have to face that fact
in open court.

The District Court should not have awarded a Summary Judgment to I.P.Mgt.
Nothing in the facts or law support the court's decision. Macdonald deserves his day in
court to present the overall facts in this case rather than the I.P .Mgt fiction.
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In the alternative, the amount of the damage award should be significantly reduced
as argued above and be strictly limited to foreclosing out Macdonald's security interest in
the mobile home and remanded back to the court for further disposition.

In either instance of remanded, the trial court award of fees and costs should be
vacated.

No personal liability should be attached to Macdonald.

Macdonald should be awarded costs on appeal.

Respondent is not entitled to an award of fees on appeal

DATED THIS 24th day ofJuly, 2014.

Don Macdonald,
Pro Se Attorney For
Defendant/Appellant Don Macdonald
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Don Macdonald, a party in the above captioned matter appearing herein pro se,
does hereby certify that on the 24th day of July 2014, I served, or caused to have served,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing document upon the following person as
indicated:
Charles Lempesis
Attorney At Law
1950 Bellerive Lane # 10
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Hand delivered
Don Macdonald
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